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BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.
II.
Charles Kingslev, in his attack on Dr. Newman,
made a mistake whose recoil on him ought to be in-
structive to liberal thinkers. Kingsley could not con-
ceive that a great scholar, a man of genius, might be
genuinely and thoroughly convinced of what to him
(Kingsley) appeared puerile superstitions, and he vir-
tually impugned the sincerity of Newman's position in
saying that the great Oratorian taught that truth need
not be the chief virtue of the Catholic clergy. It turned
out that Newman was more sincerely in his position
than Kingsley, whose sword, so gratuitiously seized,
broke in his hand. After reading Newman's Apologia,
evoked by that controversy, it is impossible to doubt
that its writer was a sort of a religious Mithridates,
—
he had lived on what rationalism would call mental
poisons until they were his natural food. It would
appear that even in early life he hunted about for
signs and wonders as other boys did for birds' nests.
As his sophistication went on with his education at
Oxford, the Bible did not contain half enough miracles
for his insatiable love of the marvellous, and in the end
he naturally added the vast supernatural lore of Catholi-
cism. Such a man is not to be censured, still less sus-
pected of insincerity, but to be studied as an invalu-
able specimen of "reversion." Where he stood the
whole learned world once stood. In the next century
it will be as extraordinar}' to find an evangelical be-
liever, of scholarship and commanding ability, as it
was to find this phenomenal Newman. Of course, 1
am speaking now of real religious believers, and not
of the retained pulpit attorneys of dogma who will al-
ways be in demand, and increase in ta.lent as their
task of professional defence becomes more difficult.
But Newman threw up his brief for the sake of his
personal conviction. It was well to take a good look
at him ; he was probably the last man of anything like
the same power that will ever believe his creed. And
it is well to take a good look at Gladstone, who is
pretty certain to be the last unprofessional champion
of orthodoxy, of like eminence^ unless in some case of
reversion. The difference between Newman and Glad-
stone is that the latter is merely a survival,—the last
evangelical survivor among the great men of Europe,
except the pulpit-attorneys ; whereas the late Cardinal
was an example of reversion to the original type.
Professor Francis W. Newman, the late Cardinal's
brother, whose friendship I have enjoyed many years,
told me that when they were young clergj'men, his
relation to his brother was affectionate. Indeed, John
Henry wrote a poem to his brother :
" Dear Frank, we both are summoned now as champions of the Lord.
Enrolled am L and shortly thou must buckle on thy sword ;
A high employ, not lightly given
—
To serve as messengers of heaven.
oh, may we follow undismayed where'er our God shall call t
And may His Spirit's present aid uphold us lest we fall !
"
When Francis—so he told me—once expressed a
doubt on some point relating to the authority of the
Church, his brother was alarmed and said, "Take
care ! if you go so far you will go farther." Francis
replied, " I will go farther when I see farther." So
at eve did the two ships speak each other, and in the
morning, as Clough said, were two towers of sail
"scarce long leagues apart descried." It was clear
that the ages of faith had transmitted to the mind of
John Henry Newman a stony deposit which became
his touchstone of all things. As time went on this
inner marble, quarried from the ancient ecclesiastical
formation, became an image, carved by his genius and
polished by his scholarship. It was his Galatea, and
under his passionate devotion took (for him) life as
the Virgin Mary.
In studying the evolution of Newman we have to
consider the evolutionary factors which in all ages and
races show good men and women worshipping cruel
gods. Such deities were originall}' created by savage
man in his own image. They are not religious but
cosmological creations. Through terror all the re-
sources of primitive man were organized around such
self-evoked phantoms, so that they became the foun-
dations of every social and political order. When
higher minds arose, and began to question these heart-
less gods, it was assailing the social foundations, the
political order, and endangering vast interests. Con-
sequently the skeptics were killed off, and the abject
believers alone remained to propagate the species.
" He that believeth not shall be damned," was sacred
law, and the unbeliever's future fires were begun on
earth. For many centuries there went on a survival
of the credulous. Heretics could find no wives; priests
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would not marry them; only belief was bred. Thus
all scholarship, all thought, and science, became ser-
vants of superstition. The type was formed of a piety
whose supreme virtue was abject assent, the Abra-
hamic Sacrifice of Reason.
Fortunately, however, the various nations were so
separated from each other, by distance and hostility,
that each developed a somewhat different type. Each
had consecrated its own variety and hated every other
as heresy. But as, with increasing communication and
migrations, these types mingled in each country, some
modus Vivendi, some principle of mutual toleration, had
to be reached. Under toleration reason began to claim
rights, science to grow, and protestant movements
asserted themselves. In the course of time the pro-
testant movement became so strong that the English
church was compelled to compromise with it, as the
only means of preserving its power, and its wealth,—
which to-day amounts to a thousand million dollars.
This amount of money constitutes an immense "breed-
ing" power. The universities, the spiritual nurseries,
were able to breed rehgious teachers as a farmer breeds
sheep. The modern church needed sheep which should
be protestant, scholarly, scientific ; but while growing
such fine wool, their logical legs must be bred too
short for them to jump over the church palings. They
must not stray into Catholicism on one side, nor into
Unitarianism on the other ; but they were free to enjoy
either inside the church, where ritualistic and ration-
alistic pastures are provided.
But in this process there is no escaping the possi-
bilities of reversion to the original type. Such was
the late Dr. Newman. His intellectual legs were not
bred short enough, nor those of his brother, for con-
finement in the pale of the church, while their moral
enthusiasm was over-bred ; so they leaped into their
congenial pastures—one into modern theism, the
other into mediffivalism. But that which makes the
case of Father Newman so phenomenal, if not unique,
is that there was no atrophy of reason. He carried
into his realm of medisevahsm a fully developed and
poHshed intellect, and a perfect syllogistic method, with
which protestant science and culture had equipped
him. But how, then, my reader may ask, could he
so give himself up to irrationalities ? Simply by trans-
ferring his reason to a new function. In him faith
and reason exchanged functions : faith was made to do
the work of reason, and reason to do the work of faith.
This may be made clearer by two brief letters writ-
ten by John Henry Newman. The first was to a
clergyman Oct. 9, 1845, the morning of the day on
which he entered the Catholic church :
" I am to be received into what I believe to be the one Church
and the one Communion of Saints this evening, if it is so ordained.
Father Dominic, the Passionist, is here, and I have begun my
confession to him. I suppose two friends will be received with
me. May I have only one-tenth part as much faith as I have in-
tellectual conviction where the truth lies ! I do not suppose any
one can have had such combined reasons pouring in upon him that
he is doing right. So far I am most blessed ; but, alas ! my heart
is so hard, and I am taking things so much as a matter of course,
that I have been quite frightened lest I should not have faith and
contrition enough to gain the benefit of the Sacraments. Perhaps
faith and reason are incompatible in one person, or nearly so."
The next letter was written more than forty-one
years later (March 23, 1887) to a theistic minister :
"What I have written about Rationalism requires to be ex-
panded. If you will let me be short and abrupt, I will contrast it
with/(;/M. ' Faith cometh by hearing,' by the Word of God. Ra-
tionalists are those who are content with conclusions to which
they have been brought by reason, but ' we are saved by faith,'
and even in cases and persons where true conclusions can be ar-
rived at, those conclusions must be believed on the ground that
' God has spoken.' A man may be a true and exact theist and yet
not have faith. What he lacks in order to faith is the grace of
God, which is given in answer to prayer. I have written as much
as my fingers will write, and more perhaps than you can read.
P. S. Liberalism is the dt-vflopnimt of Rationalism. It views
faith as a mere natural gift, the like and the consequence of rea-
son and the moral sense ; and by reason and the moral sense he
estimates it and measures its objects. He soon comes to be sat-
isfied with other men, though they ignore faith and its objects,
provided they recognise reason and the moral sense. This is Lib-
eralism."
The first of these letters is interpreted by the
second. We can detect in his fear that he had not
as much faith as he had intellectual conviction that
his heart (which he calls "hard ") was faintly carrying
on the skepticism which his reason had renounced,
—
his intellect having assumed the role of faith. His
dread is that his reason may have had something to
do with his conversion and his convictions. There is
something rationalistic, consequently sinful, in be-
lieving even Catholicism on intellectual grounds. Such
belief, to be right, must be solely of God's authority,
of divine grace, of faith. "God has spoken": let
Logic keep silence before him. Let not reason dare
to add its miserable seal to the divine word. The
function of reason is thus withdrawn from the normal
work of determining what is true ; that is already de-
termined by the word of God, and is received by faith
as a supernatural gift. What then is the function of
reason ? Simply, we may suppose, to shine, so that
the less brilliant believers may say, with Cardinal
Manning, "No one who does not intend to be laughed
at will henceforward say that the Catholic religion is
fit only for weak intellects and unmanly brains."
But this casting off by faith of the restraining grace
of common sense is suicidal. There was nothing to
check the progress of Newman into the dark ages,
which, indeed, he reached long before he reached
Rome. "I do not shrink," he said, "from uttering
my firm conviction that it would be a gain to the
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countr}' were it vastly more superstitious, more big-
oted, more gloomy, more fierce in its religion, than
it at present shows itself to be." Contrasting heretics
and heresiarchs, he said: "The latter should meet
with no mercy; he assumes the office of the Tempter,
and, so far as his error goes, must be dealt with by the
competent authority, as if he were embodied evil. To
spare him is a false and dangerous pit}'. . It is to en-
danger the souls of thousands, and it is uncharitable
towards himself." When accused, on this passage,
of wishing to reestablish the torture of the Inquisition,
Newman replied that he merely contemplated banish-
ment of the heresiarch ; but in so saying he momen-
tarily relapsed into carnal rationalism. What ! banish
to other lands the "Tempter," the "embodied evil,"
to "endanger the souls of thousands" in some other
country ! However, this was onl}' when Newman was
on his way to his mediaeval goal. Once there, the "re-
version " was complete. In the sphere of angels and
saints there was no more denunciation or conciliation
of the humanities.
As Emerson sang "Goodbye, proud world," and
retired to his optimistic hermitage with Nature, New-
man bade Nature goodbye, especially human nature,
and went mto his mediaeval solitude. It was not in
1890 that Father Newman died, but in 1845. So far
as this world was concerned,—or the only world for
which his faculties had been trained, that of theol-
ogy,—it could exist no more for him. His intolerance
had been the fierce heat of a warrior in the battle for
an English field he hoped to win. There could be no
hope of winning England for Rome. Nor could there
be any further search for truth : that was all known to
the infallible Pope. I had a conversation with Dr.
Dollinger in 187 1 in which he said, that the dogma of
infallibility rendered theological investigation im-
possible in the Catholic Church. "No man of any
self-respect will investigate only to arrive at foregone
conclusions." Newman's fine armor had all to be laid
aside. It is not to be regretted, when one reads the
ferocities of his Anglican days. Swinburne could not
have described him as the one thornless rose of a
thorny stock had he continued an Anglican warrior.
And as for the thorny stock it is in England a thing of
the past. Catholicism is no longer a militant institu-
tion. It should be credited to that Church that this
same thinker who as a protestant clergyman (son, too,
of a Huguenot woman) had suggested restoration of
the Inquisition, when he became a Catholic wrote
concerning the St. Bartholomew massacre, "No Pope
can make evil good," " Infallibility is not Impecca-
bility."
It will be seen therefore that while Catholicism
was the entombment of Newman as a factor of intel-
lectual progress, it restored to his angry face that na-
tive sweetness that makes the smile of death. He
had no more controversy with a world which was being
guided as it should be guided, by the Trinity and the
angelic hosts. "Perfect faith casteth out all fear that
hath torment." Such thornless roses are costly how-
ever
;
personal sweetness is hardly compensation for
a lost leader. Amid the struggles of humanity, even
a fierce worker is better than one devoting herculean
arms to magic wafers in a cloister. Though so large
a part of the man was wasted, so far as direct ser-
vice is concerned, probably his indirect service,
—
that which would have most grieved him had he been
conscious of it,—was greater than any he could have
given as a liberal. When his works are forgotten,
Newman himself will be read, as a writing on the wall,
admonishing youth of alternatives not to be escaped.
The "kindly Light " which leads on paths not seen or
chosen may produce a picturesque figure, but one
which can no more warm the world than a painted
flame. He who would help mankind must not aspire
to the smile of "angel faces," but to win smiles to the
wan faces of the poor and suffering. Cardinal Man-
ning pronounced Newman "the greatest witness for
the faith," and it is true in two senses. He was a
witness that his cloistered faith can, as dogma, have
no open-air habitat in England. The secession of
scholars to Rome which began with him, ended with
him. The secession from his own Oratory began in
his time, all going into Rationalism. Nay, Newman
himself, seems to have felt a mighty hunger in the far
land to which he had gone, and thirteen years ago re-
turned to his Oxford home. Trinity College, which
killed the fatted calf, and put a ring on his finger in
the form of a Fellowship. The colleges which once
changed their dinner hour to prevent students hearmg
his sermons, now suspended work to meet him, and
hear him preach in a Catholic Chapel. Despite St.
Paul's exhortations to avoid those who caused divisions,
he became more friendly with his freethinking brother
Francis, and fraternised with heresiarch Jowett, of
the "Essaj^s and Reviews." Two visits, indeed, he
paid to Oxford, and he wandered through the western
counties, visiting old friends, chiefly protestants, and
meeting them with pathetic emotion. No Englishman
can live on saints alone, much less on dogmas. Car-
dinal Newman's combination of mediaeval philosophy
(consecrated as "faith ") with latter-day culture, repre-
sented a hybrid soul that cannot reproduce itself. The
Catholic church does not aim to produce such men,
and while proud of Newman's genius, always feared
him. For his unworldliness amounted to imprudence
in its readiness to tear away the casuistic moss which
covers the repulsive dogmas on which the Church is
founded. The jagged rocks were made visible by his
candor without being adorned enough by his elo-
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quence. The future of that Church depends on the
obscurity of its dogmas and the dimness of its history.
It is getting free of its antiquarian scandals by reason
of their antiquity ; it is liberated from political suspi-
cion by the fortunate loss of temporal authority ; there
is no reason why it should not enjoy a new departure
if it should throw itself into sympathy with humanity,
preserve its aesthetic, ornamental, and non-sabbatarian
characteristics, and leave its dogmas wrapped in Latin
and in archaic phrases, "not understanded of the
people."
DR. CARUS ON "THE ETHICAL PROBLEM."*
BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.
The capital point under discussion in this little
volume is the basis of ethics. Dr. Carus is mistaken
in saying in the Preface that it was in consequence of
an editorial on "The Basis of Ethics and the Ethical
Movement" in The Open Court, that he was invited to
deliver these lectures. It was at my suggestion that
the Board of Trustees of the Chicago Society for
Ethical Culture extended to him the invitation, and
my feeling simply was that so interesting a set of phi-
losophical ideas as Dr. Carus was advancing in The
Open Court should have a hearing viva voce, as well
as through the printed page. Dr. Carus accepting,
I announced his lectures on my own concluding Sun-
day, asking our members and friends to give them at-
tention and careful consideration. Inasmuch, how-
ever, as Dr. Carus has taken the occasion incidentally
to reinforce his earlier criticism upon the Ethical
Movement ; to emphasize the differences (real or sup-
posed) between himself and those of us who are active
in this movement ; and indeed to take us somewhat
severely to task, it becomes proper and, perhaps, nec-
essary that I should say something by way of reply.
First, let me endeavor to understand as nearly as
I can what Dr. Carus means. For our Ethical Socie-
ties the case is a grave one, in his judgment. There
is something we are to do of a more pressing nature
;
if we do not heed the call, we shall "pass out of ex-
istence." We are not to "rest satisfied with nega-
tions"; we should cease a " non-committal policy "
;
should "speak out boldly and with no uncertain
voice." We are reminded of our proper place ; for,
says Dr. Carus with something of a prophet's impres-
siveness, "There is one point you ought to under-
stand well
: The ethical movement will work for the
progress of mankind whatever you do." Indeed he
gives us such a sense of our insignificance that we are
led to feel that more for our own sake than for the
cause of progress we should apply ourselves to the all-
""The Ethical Problem," by Dr. Paul Carus. Three lectures delivere(
at the invitation of the Board of Trustees before the Society for Ethica
Culture of Chicago, in June, 1890. Chicago : The Open Court Publishing Co.
1890. (pp. xii, 90).
important task ; since the cause of progress will be
served in any case.
This task is to answer the question. What is the
basis of ethics ? Assuming that the ethical movement
was started because dogmatic religion no longer serves
as such a basis, he asks. What new basis do we offer?
I confess to having had some difficulty in finding out
just what the author means by "basis" in this rela-
tion. Speaking generally, it is declared to be "the
philosophical foundation upon which ethics rests," and
so "the reason why man should regulate his actions
in a certain way"; it is "a philosophical view back "
of ethics. We get light from a concrete illustration,
namely, the old religion which once served as a basis,
the 'reason why' being found in ' the will of God.'
Every religion is really, according to Dr. Carus, "a
conception of the world applied to practical life"; it
differs from philosophy simply in that such a world-
conception is treated practically and is endorsed by a
whole society (instead of single thinkers). The basis
of ethics thus turns out to be a certain conception of
the world or "theory of the universe"; it corresponds
to what is called philosophy or theology ; indeed, our
author makes the broad statement, "The ethical
stimulus has been implanted into man by religion,"*
and he adds with sufficient vigor, "any ethics with-
out a philosophical view back of it is no ethics, but
ethical sentimentality."
What "basis of ethics" does Dr. Carus himself
present? For it is not mere criticism that he offers
;
indeed, the criticism of the Ethical Societies is but in-
cidental, and the author's evident intention is to pre-
sent apositive solution of "' the ethical problem," i. e.,
to point out the true basis of ethics. " Religion," he
declares, "will r'etnain a conception of the world that
serves as a regulative principle of action. Yet this con-
ception will cease to be the product of an instinctive
imagination, it will 'become a scientific system of cer-
tain truths that have to be examined and proved by
the usual methods of scientific enquiry" (the italics
are mine). What then is the scientific world-concep-
tion, the true basis of ethics ? I confess to having
been completely taken aback, when as I read on I dis-
covered that Dr. Carus declined to answer the ques-
tion, contenting himself with vaguely saying that the
true philosophy will be one which is in accordance
with facts, which seems equivalent to saying that the
scientific system will be a scientific system. The dif-
ferent philosophies are mentioned, viz., "materialism
and spiritualism, realism and idealism, monism and
agnosticism," and the author actually approves of
* How much foundation such a statement has as matter of history is tol-
erably well known to students of Sociology and Primitive Culture. I would
comment! to every interested reader the article on "Ethics and Religion," by
the learned Professor C. H. Toy, of Harvard University, in the Fopiilar Science
Monlldy K^xW (or May), 1890.
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Professor Adler's proposition that an ethical move-
ment should not commit itself to any of them. Does
any reader wonder that lam at a loss to know why Dr.
Carus should have taken the attitude to our societies
which he has, almost twitting us on our lack of cour-
age, suggesting that our ethics is but ".ethical senti-
mentality," and saying that if the ethical societies do
not increase as they ought to, it is because they have
no definite opinion, because they lack a foundation,
trying to be broad and becoming vague (x. xi)? What
I had at least hoped for vi^as an exposition of the way
in which the monistic world-conception would serve
as a basis of ethics ; for to me personally at any rate
and, I think, to many more this would have been of
considerable interest. But monism is classed along with
agnosticism, and materialism as one of the "thought-
constructions of theorizing philosophers," (16. 17);
so that after all the high notes, the vigorous charging
and counter-charging we are left with the barren
dictum, ''The new ethics is based upon facts, and is
applied to facts." Taking this into account I am
not at all sure that I know what Dr. Carus means by
a "basis of ethics," and as it is not wise to criticise till
one knows what he is criticising, I will forbear criti-
cism. I will not say that the author is not clear as to
what he means, but generally speaking the remark of
The Ethical Record which he quotes seems to have
fresh illustration : " We think there is some lack of
clearness as to what a basis of ethics means."
There are, however, two distinct questions : What
is the true world conception, upon which every spe-
cial science may, in a broad and rather loose sense, be
said to be based ; and secondly, what is the ultimate
principle in ethics itself ? The second question might
be more distinctly stated as follows : Not what is the
/'(?jr/j- I?/ ethics, in the sense of " a philosophical view
back " of it (a theology or philosophy), but what is
the basic principle in ethics ? Ethics, in the popular
sense, being a system of rules for conduct, it is neces-
sary, if it is to be treated scientifically, that there
should be some supreme rule, by their agreement or
disagreement* with which all lesser rules should be
judged. Now the most charitable construction I can
put on Dr. Carus's method of proceedure is that he has
confused these two questions ; and indeed, in the last
two chapters of the book he more or less leaves the
realm, of world-conceptions and devotes himself to the
humbler question of the standard (or what I have
called the supreme rule) of right action. Yet in the
treatment of this second question, I am sorry to say
* This rule, it is needless to say, would itself be interpreted or '• based " in
terms of the world-conception or theory of the universe which one holds, just
as the first principles of the other sciences would be : the theist would inter-
pret them in one way, the monist in another, etc.; but the first principles of
all special sciences qua special sciences are peculiar to themselves: otherwise
taken they would be identical, i. e., if there is any such thing as first prin-
ciples of the ;
that I find the author's thought more or less confused
and inconsistent. Ethics, it is repeatedly insisted,
must be based on facts
;
yet in one clear-sighted pas-
sage he says, "Ethics is our attitude toward the facts
of reality " (the italics are mine). The latter remark
seems to imply that the same facts may be looked at
from different attitudes
;
yet if so, how are the facts
themselves to decide which attitude we shall take ? It
is true, as Dr. Carus happily says, that "all knowledge
can be formulated as an ethical prescript." For ex-
ample, the knowledge that friction produces fire finds
its practical application in the ethical rule : In case
you want fire, produce it by friction. But the facts
in the case do not in the slightest determine whether
we shall produce fire ; we may contemplate the
facts with purely speculative curiosity and do noth-
ing, or we may have an aversion to fire and so do
nothing, or we may wish fire and then we shall pro-
duce it by the method indicated. It is evident that
not all the knowledge of all the facts of the universe
would by itself lead to moral action, or indeed to ac-
tion of any kind ; so that it would be more accurate,
and so more clarifying to the mind, to say that ethics
should face, regard, or know the facts of the universe
rather than to say that it should be based upon them.
Evidently the root-question in ethics is, what should
we wish ? Once knowing what we wish, the know-
ledge of the facts and the laws of nature is valuable
to us ; and once knowing what we should wish, ac-
quaintance with such facts and laws becomes ethically
valuable and we have a standard for our entire con-
duct. It is at this point that I find Dr. Carus's views
radically insufficient ; indeed, his ethics seems a some-
thing "in the air." '^If," he says, "you wish to ex-
ist, obey reason, "(italics are my own). But the very
question is, not what or whether we wish, but what we
should wish ? To say, "If you wish fire, produce it
by friction," does not say whether we shall so produce
it ; to tell us, "In order to build a house, observe the
laws of gravitation," does not call us to observe the
laws of gravitation ; to say, "If you wish to exist,
obey reason," puts upon us no obligation to obey rea-
son. It is true most persons do wish to live and in
consistency therewith we may well say that they should
act in such and such a manner ; but if any one says,
I do not care to live, moral obligation, according to
this view, ceases to have any application to him. If
any one says, I do not care about my health, the laws
of health are meaningless to him ; if another says, I
do not care about my family, the whole of family-
ethics loses its validity for him. It has long been
plain to me that resting ethics on our matter-of-fact
wishes or instincts is not establishing ethics, but un-
dermining it and leaving it a something " in the air."
There must be a rational consideration and rational
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settlement of the question. What of our desires or
wishes or instincts have a right to rule in us, before
there can be any such thing as a scientific ethics.
Notwithstanding, however, this lack of thorough-
ness in Dr. Cams' s treatment of the question, his dis-
cussion of some of the different standards of right and
wrong is interesting. He defends the naturalness of
altrustic and social motives, against those who hold
that only egotistic motives are natural to man. He
goes too far, it appears to me, in identifying ethics
with the social duties, there being as much rational
foundation for an " ought " in relation to one's self as
in relation to others. He conducts an excellent po-
lemic against those who would find in pleasure or
happiness the end of all action, though he surely does
an injustice to Utilitarianism in saying that "it slurs
over the difference between moral goodness and ma-
terial usefulness." The standard of good and bad
which he appears to reach (after sundry physiological
and psychological observations) is " the development
of human soul- life"; whatever tends to preserve and
promote this is good, while all efforts to the contrary
are bad. By "soul-life " is meant the soul-life of the
whole race, including all its future generations. But
is not this rather vague ? Is not the standard an un-
certain one? "Soul-life," we are told, is made up of
representations of the surrounding world and of man's
relations thereto, and includes an increasing power
over nature along with an increasing knowledge. But
do we not require to know what type of soul-life we
shall seek to further and promote? Persons of large
knowledge and ample power over nature may be
of one kind or another ; they may be modest or
vain, friendly or unfriendly, truthful or false, chaste
or licentious, public-spirited or selfish. In follow-
ing the injunction to preserve and promote soul-life,
should we not have our minds directed to the sort
of soul-life that is truly desirable ? Dr. Carus does,
indeed, speak vaguely of " the standard of human
soul-life," and elsewhere uses the expression ".health
and nobility of our soul," but without indicating what
he means. The point is of importance because, as
the author in substance says, the effects of all our ac-
tions whether good or evil remain, long after we have
passed out of existence, because the examples we set
and the thoughts we utter, whether good or bad, live
on in the souls of our friends and our children, and the
motive for living for eternity, of which the author
makes impressive use, would seem to appeal as much
to the bad man who wishes to perpetuate his badness,
as to the good man who wishes to promote; soul-life of
a different type. I do not say that these difficulties
are insuperable, and simply record my impression of
the author's failure to deal with them.
In still another sense of the word "basis," Dr.
Carus proposes the principle of truthfulness as a basis
of ethics. In fact, so much "Zweideutigkeit " in the
use of terms, I think I have rarely seen in any other
ostensibl}' scientific treatise. It is difficult for me to
understand further how Dr. Carus could proceed so
carelessly in treating of ethical "theories." Intui-
tionalism is identified with supernaturalism, and Paley
on the strength of his theology is called an intuition-
alist, while he was in fact one of the founders of Utili-
tarianism. Hedonism is treated separately from Utili-
tarianism, although every form of Utilitarianism has
been hedonistic, modern utilitarianism being simply
universalistic hedonism.
I have spoken of two distinct questions, which Dr.
Carus seems to confuse ; there is a third which he
fails to distinguish from the others, and in the treat-
ment of which I am glad for his sake to-day that he
falls into a happy inconsistency. This relates to the
motive for regulating our conduct according to the
standard which has been supposably discovered. It
is one thing to know what is the true world-theory,
another to know what is the standard of right, another
to know the true motive for regarding that standard.
The position which I have always taken (and I think
all the other ethical lecturers have taken), is that when
we once really know what right is, there is no other
course for us but to obey it, simple reverence for the
right being the only true, the only moral motive. We
have to most carefully study what the right is, but
once knowing it our only attitude is (i. e., should be)
obedience. To ask why we should do the right is
meaningless, it is to go oiit of the moral region alto-
gether. Now when Dr. Carus proposes the question,
"Why must I feel bound by any 'right' or moral
law," when he says that if we demand of a man "that
he refrain from doing wrong and be guided by what is
right, we are bound to give him a reason why," he
seems to join with those who are ftot satisfied with the
moral motive, and after reading those remarks in the
opening pages of his volume, I observed with particu-
lar closeness the subsequent course of his argument
to see what "reason " or "why" he would give. Yet
he had already casually spoken of the "motive to do
right"; and what was my surprise and gratification
to find him later on speaking distinctly of the "aspir-
ation to live in perfect harmony with the moral law,"
(p. 37); of the "moral motives in the moral purity," (p.
6i); and boldl}' saying that "an ethical teacher ought
to appeal to the highest motives man is capable of,"
(p. 6i.) In fact. Dr. Carus gives no "reason why" in
the sense of a motive beyond the moral motive; and
is well aware that so to do would be not to explain,
but to degrade morality. Yet if so, what necessity
was there for him to take such an attitude of antagon-
ism to us? We too are trying, in the measure of our
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ability, to plant (or better, to develop) the moral mo-
tive in the souls of men. Dr. Carus said, addressing
the Chicago Ethical Society, "You may say it matters
not why a man leads a moral life, so that his life be
moral." This is a grotesque description of our posi-
tion. The motive of right conduct is what makes it
moral; if that has been said once, it has been said a
hundred times on the Chicago platform.
To conclude then this, I fear, already too long
article : It is true that the ethical movement has not
committed itself to a particular world-theory; it leaves
its members and lecturers free to adopt whatever theory
most approves itself to their reason ; instead of setting
up a standard of philosophical orthodoxy as Dr. Carus
seems to propose (though he fails at the critical mo-
ment), it believes that philosophical systems should
have a free field and no favor and that ///(?/ one should
survive whose claims prove the strongest in the strug-
gle for existence—and all within the fold of an ethical
fellowship, held together by community of moral aim.
Dr. Carus, I am sorr}' to see, has not outgrown the
sectarian principle of the churches and would appar-
ently give us another sect as "exclusive" and "in-
tolerant " as any in the past, though (Gottlob !) it will
slay with the sword of the spirit and not with the arm
of flesh. Secondly, it is not true that the ethical lec-
turers have not furnished a "basis of ethics " in the
sense of a standard of right and wrong ; each of them
has done so and estimated all particular duties by their
relation thereto; and although on some points of spec-
ulative significance all may not be agreed, they are
sufficiently so for practical sympathy and co-opera-
tion—certain great duties being recognized by all
alike. Our highest aim is to make men autonomous
in their moral conduct, as indeed Dr. Carus thinks we
should, (p. 49,) apparently forgetting his earlier chal-
lenge that if we no longer believe in the supernatural
God, we should giye account of "that God " who gives
us authority to preach (xii). What is more, any of
us may believe in the "Supernatural God," if so it
seems reasonable for him to do ; the movement is by
no means committed to Anti-Supernaturalism, as he
seems to think, whatever were the motives of some of
those active in the beginning, and it has quite another
reason for being than that which Dr. Carus ascribes to
it.* Thirdly, as to the much abused "basis" in still
another possible meaning, namely, of a motive for the
regulation of one's life, we have from the beginning
recognized the same "basis" which Dr. Carus sug-
gests, viz., the motive to do right, the aspiration to
live in perfect harmony with the moral law.
; stated in the concluding chapter of my Ethical Religion
and still more simply and clearly and convincingly in the first two chaptei
of Dr. Stanton Colt's just published Dc Ethische Bewegung in der Religioi
(Leipsic : O. R. Reisland). •
^
MR. SALTER ON "THE ETHICAL PROBLEM."
Mr. S.\lter thinks that I have not properly under-
stood the position of the leaders of the ethical move-
ment. But Mr. Salter's reply is good evidence that
I did not misunderstand them. He says: "It is not
true that the ethical lecturers have not furnished a
basis of ethics in the sense of a standard of right and
wrong ;" and yet he takes pains to explain that b}' this
basis of ethics he understands certain ethical rules,
and especially the supreme ethical rule, but not the
reason of his ethical rules which finds expression in
a philosophical or religious view back of ethics. The
latter alone can properly be called a basis of ethics,
and all the ethical teachers agree that that which zve
call the basis of ethics is not needed. They look upon
it as of mere speculative significance.
Mr. Salter fails to see the indispensability of a
philosophical or religious view back of ethics ; he
fails to see that it alone can give character to ethics,
it alone can change the instinctive morality of our
conscience into truly rational and self conscious
ethics.
Conscience and the moral law are not so absolute
as Mr. Salter in his book declares them to be. Re-
ligion and ethics have developed : the facts of an er-
ring conscience as well as of the religious superstitions
prove that both have grown from experience. Both
religion and ethics have developed together, for they
are twins.
When saying, religion and ethics have grown
from experience, it means that the stern facts of life
have taught us what desires should be suppressed
and what wishes should rule supreme. The facts of
life themselves have taught us our attitude toward
our surroundings ; they have taught us the moral laws.
It appears to me that the "moral law" has a dif-
ferent meaning with Mr. Salter than with me. The
moral law, whenever I use the word, is simply a
formulation of the lessons taught us by experience.
Moral laws are—like the laws of hygiene—statements
of those conditions which will keep our sentiments and
motives in perfect health.
Mr. Salter knows no ' reason why ' for his moral law,
and he imagines that to give a reason why "would be
not to explain but to degrade morahty."* In this way
* Mr. Salter writes in a marginal note on the proof of this article :
You must be aware that I use this language in another connection; viz.,
in speaking of the motive for right-doing."
I am accustomed to distinguish between motive and reason. (See "Funda-
mental Problems, p. 80. lines 21—25.) Motive is the cause that effects an
action. A cause in the domain of human action is called motive, for it is that
which makes the will move. I distinguish between motive and reason, but I
cannot think of a motive without a reason. A motive is a cause that consists
of an idea, the idea acting as an irritant or stimulus upon a man, thus pro-
voking him to action. The contents of this idea is called reason.
I maintain that the motive to do this or that must have a content. This
content is its reason. The rule do that which is right " (or the intention " I
wish to do that which is right") is without practical value, unless I know what
is right. In order to know what is right I must ascertain it, and I can do so
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ethics is, in Mr. Salter's mind, inseparably intertwined
with mysticism.
Our intention is indeed to explain morality, and
here rises our conflict with the policy pursued by the
ethical lecturers. We consider scientific enquiry into
the reason why of ethics, not as a degradation, but as
a duty. The ethical lecturers do not acknowledge the
reason why, presented by orthodox theology. They are
therefore bound to give a new reason why. If they re-
fuse to do so, their whole movement is founded on sand.
It is an old experience which perhaps most of us
who have sought for light and endeavored to under-
stand their own ideals and aspirations have felt, that
every enthusiasm, above all religious enthusiasm, re-
gards science and all close scrutiny with suspicion.
The relentless dissections of an exact analj'sis appear
as a sacrilege.
The reader will feel in Mr. Salter's reply the un-
easiness caused by our procedure. He invites us to
present our opinion,* but he resents a clear statement
of our differences, f This statement of our differences
may have been emphatic, but I feel confident that it
was not made so as to be offensive, for I have at the
same time not concealed my respect
—
yea, my admira-
tion for the efforts, the seriousness and the noble
ideals of the ethical societies.
Mr. Salter is embarrassed by our criticism, be-
cause he neither feels the need of a basis of ethics,
nor does he feel urged to have a scientific explanation
of it. Ethics regarded as unexplainable, appears to
him greater, nobler, and holier than if it were ex-
plained. Yet we can assure Mr. Salter that morality
will not be degraded by any explanation. On the con-
trary, it will rise in its purest and holiest dignity.
only by enquiring after the reason why it is right. Thus the ' reason why ' is
inevitable whatever standpoint we lake.
* Mr. Hegeler in a letter of May Sth, 189c, wrote : " In the last number o£
The Open Court that reached me, I find Dr. Carus has defined our position
towards Ingersoll and his followers and also that towards the Societies for
Ethical Culture, I believe the article was written by him already some time
ago, and the publication was delayed by our hesitancy to open what I will
call civilized war upon you. I have told the Doctor already,—a long while
ago,— that it was our duty to do this."
So, also, in a letter of June 4th, Mr. Hegt ler wrote : " We ought to clear
our differences of o^union for the Keneral good. You are an influential public
teacher, and 1 certainly spei.d a large amount of money for the same object—
and avoidance of waste and also the reduction of mental as well as physical
struggle or war to the smallest possible limit (but not the avoidance of the
struggle) belongs in my opinion to the essence of Ethics. The energy thereby
saved we have to use for a • building up.' "
To this Mr. Salter replied, on June Sth : " I agree with you entirely that
we should endeavor to clear up our differences .... Nothing but preoccupa-
tion and lack of time have prevented me heretofore from explaining myself at
length to you. Indeed, I hoped that when my book came out, giving my views
at such length, I should have the benefit of criticism from you and Dr. Carus.
I, by no nieans, count my present views as final, as indeed I say in my preface.
And I wish to learn and assimilate all of positive truth, which you give in
The Open Court—and I have already gained help from it. .-So please criticise
me in public or in correspondence—and, at least in the summer, I will agree
to answer to the best of my ability, and I will ahuays attentively read and
consMet."— [Published with Mr. Salter's permission.}
t Mr. Salter says in a marginal note ; " I did not invite you t
movement in your public lectures ; still you had a perfect right
I am not sorry.."
Mr. Salter considers the demands of the conscience
as an ultimate fact ; it is to him "the immovable rock"
upon which he bases the ethical movement. He asserts
the independence of morality from religion as well as
science ; he attempts to make morality absolute. If a
gardener, in this wa)', makes the tree independent of
its roots, he becomes a wood- cutter; he will deprive
the tree of the conditions of its life.
If Mr. Salter would ask himself how he had come
into the possession of the ethical stimulus, he would
soon be urged to travel the same path with us.
The ethics of mysticism is only the prophesy of
ethics based on science. It is the bud's promise of a
fruit. It is like astrology which will mature into
astronomy. The astrologer has set his heart on the
mystic element of his profession ; it alone possesses
in his mind the charm of beauty, and he watches with
great grief how the bud loses that beauty while it
ripens into a fruit.
I have read Mr. Salter's article with great care,
and have compared his objections with the statements
made in his book " Ethical Religion." In the hope
of coming to a mutual understanding, I shall not rest
satisfied with this summary reply, but I shall go over
the whole ground again. The importance of the ques-
tion under discussion and the prominence of Mr. Sal-
ter in the ethical aspirations of the present time re-
quire a most careful treatment of the subject, p. c.
COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE BRAIN.
The question has often been discussed which part
of the brain contains the physiological conditions
which distinguish man from his lower fellow-beings.
The idea that these conditions reside in the forehead
is a most popular belief
;
yet the great physiologist
Meynert concludes, that, all abstract reasoning being
impossible without language, the reasoning capacities
of man must have their central seat in the region of
speech which is situated round 'CVi^ fossa Sylvii, con-
sisting mainly of the insula, the operculum, and the
first frontal convolution.
The frontal lobe, accordingly, contains some func-
tions which are not at all the exclusive prerogative of
man. It is true that the human head alone is dis-
tinguished by a strongly marked frontal development.
Yet there are several reasons which make man's fore-
head rise so proudly. Among them the development
of the frontal convolutions is one, but by no means
the most prominent reason. The frontal lobe of man
is 42, of a monkey 35, of a bear 30, of a dog 32 per
cent, of the whole brain. The rise of the human fore-
head is chiefly conditioned by the strong develop-
ment of the insula and the whole region around the
fissure of Sylvius as well as of the lenticular body,
upon which the insula rests. The grovyth of these
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parts raises the cortex which covers them and thus
makes the forehead rise. In addition to these facts
we notice that the temporal lobe, like a thick wedge,
is pushed forward so as to lift the whole brain still
higher.
The region of the fissure of Sylvius appears very
low in a sheep, and the temporal lobe (In the diagram
of a sheep's brain S par.) lies behind it in a longi-
tudinal direction. Let us imagine that we could turn








of a sheep so as
to resemble the
brain of a dog
or a fox. In the
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as to be directly
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trudes so much
that it lies below
and a little i n






brain of a fox,)
show a very reg-
ular arrange-
ment. The fis-
sure of Sylvius {R f) is surrounded by four horse-
shoe-shaped convolutions. In man their arrange-
ment is much modified but still traceable. The
first horseshoe alone is fully preserved in its lower,
temporal course, {SI') ; it still reaches (in arc I)
.round the fissure of Sylvius, but the greatest part of
its upper or parietal portion has disappeared. The
second arch (arc II) corresponds to the Siikits inter-
parictalis {Sip) and Sulcus occipitalis exterior {S. occ. e).
Its horseshoe form is still well preserved in the mon-
key's brain, while it is scarcely recognizable in man.
The frontal part of the next arch, situated between
Leur
of Rolando in the brain of man and
BRAIN OF AS ELEPHANT. (Afti
5.5. Fissure of Sylvius.
S.S. S'S'. S"5". Fiist, second, and third superior convolutions.
/A, II A, III A. First, second, and third anterior convolutions.
IP, II P, III P. First, second, and third posterior convolutions
O. O. Suborbital convolutions.
The first superior convolution iS.S.) corresponds to the Fissure
monkey.
The second and third superior convolutions interrupt the continuity between the corresponding
anterior and posterior convolutions.
M. Leuret says on the subject: "If we suppress in our mind the superior convolutions up to the
place where the cross appears in the diagram, and if we imagine that the anterior convolutions are
continuous with the posterior convolutions, we have an arrangement ai it appears in the ruminants and
solipeds."
The same author says : " No animal, not even the whale has a brain so large as the elephant. Even
man himself is interior to this animal, not only with regard to the whole volume of brain, but also with
regard to the number, extent, and undulations of the cerebral convolutions.
the second and fourth horseshoe-shaped furrow, corre-
sponds to the posterior central convolution in the
monkey and in man, (limited in front by the Central
Fissure C). Man possesses here another well discern-
ible central convolution (called the anterior central
convolution C. a).
There is scarcely any frontal lobe in the fox's
brain, except the convolution which surrounds the
anterior branch of the fissure of Sylvius {Ra). It
is crossed in its upper part by a horizontal fissure
{cm). These
changes in the
arrange m en t
alter the direc-





nivorous m a m-
mals and in the
monkey it forms
with the base of
the brain an an-
gle of about 45
degrees, while in










key's brain by a
special develop-
ment of the oc-
cipital ; and the
fox's by a devel-
opment of the
parietal lobes.
"Had these proportions no meaning," says Meynert,
"comparative anatomy would be a loss of time and
serious men should leave it alone."
One of the most important modifications in the
arrangement of the different parts remains still to be
noted. This is the change from the horizontal ar-
rangement where (as in the sheep) the cerebellum and
Medulla Oblongata lie in one line with the elongated
brain, to the erect position which brings the medulla
directly underneath the hemispheres -and places the
cerebellum below the occipital lobe. This mechanical
change of so momentous consequences, must evolu-
'^
nd Gratioh
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tionally have begun long before it could have been
acquired by exercise, since the incurvation of the pons
in ihe human embryo which thrusts both pons and
cerebellum forward, thus producing the conditions that
determine the further development of the brain in a
supra- and not in a juxta-position, takes place at a
very early period.
3'
S. occ. e. Sulcus occipitalis i
S. po. Sulcus preeoccipitalis.





S. i. occ. Sulcus interoccipitalis.
Sulcus Parallelis.
Fr. Forehead. Tm. Temporal lobi
Of.\ arc //,
gi am, " Brain of a Fox
BRAIN OF A FOX.
Olf. Olfactory bulb.
—
arc. I. Arcus parietalis primus.
—
arc. IT. Arcus parie-










man became a sight-animal because the mechanism
of his brain arrangement forced him into an erect walk,
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superiority of a man who "was thereat the time," and conse-
quently knows it all. Well, that's the way with me. Sometimes,
a trivial circumstance mentioned in the papers will whirl me back-
wards into the antediluvian epoch, when I lived in Old Virginny,
where people had some value ; where men, women, and children
would bring in the open market from ten to fifteen dollars a pound.
Once I saw a woman sell for twenty dollars a pound, but she was
very beautiful, and wonderfully white,^—for a slave.
Old slavery memories came down upon me in a gale the other
day, when reading in the newspapers that George Delaney had
been tried at Newport, Kentucky, for stealing shirt studs and
clothing from Winston Turner, a negro seventy-four years old.
It was developed at the trial that Mr. Turner had once been the
slave of Henry Clay, of whom he entertains a most affectionate
remembrance. Mr. Turner's veneration for his old master shows
how the human soul can dwindle and dry up in slavery, and how
basely we respect those who claim to be "our betters," if they
prove their claim by force. " Ole Marse Henry, he was mighty
kind to us niggahs," said the grateful Mr. Turner ; " he never had
us hoss-vvhipped nor nothin' o' that kind." Being asked if he was
present at Henry Clay's death, he answered, " No, Marse Clay
he done got broke before he died, and he tuk and sold me, but
maybe I didn't think lots of Marse Henry." Mr. Turner's answer
shows the corrupting influence of slavery on the spirit of its vic-
tims. Here was a man who spoke with reverence and honor of
another man who had actually sold him for money ; and so be-
numbed were his moral sensibilities by the bondage of his youth,
that he could even find absolution for the seller in the excuse that
" he done got broke," and therefore was compelled to raise a little
money by the sale of Mr. Winston Turner.
The contrast between s-lavery and freedom has been made
visible to me in a hundred different ways ; by books, by speeches,
and by sermons ; but I have not seen any pictorial illustration of
it so graphic and intelligible as the trial of a man in Kentucky for
stealing shirt studs from a negro, who was formerly a slave. In
the days of slavery such a trial would have been impossible, be-
cause a slave could not own anything then ; he and his were the
property of his master ; and supposing that he could have enjoyed
the right of property, shirt studs would have been a superfluity
belonging to the regions of enchantment, a vanity beyond the
reach of his most hopeful and happy imagination. I assume that
the shirt studs were of gold, otherwise they would hardly have
been worth stealmg. I remember very well the condition of the
negroes of Kentucky in the days " before the flood"; they had
bright hopes of treading golden pavements in the celestial city,
but the possibility of some day wearing golden shirt studs in the
streets of Newport was too deep in the heart of miracle for their
uneducated minds to see. I know that emancipation did not pro-
vide golden shirt studs for the negro, but it gave to him the chance
and right of wearing them, and these are the signs of his re-
demption.
The contrast presented by that Kentucky trial sent me roam-
ing over the imperial domain of retrospection, the Elysian fields
of Old Age, wherein I love to wander at the gloaming of my life,
and where I can find reminiscences on every bush and tree.
Here is one I plucked the other day, in the shape of an ancient
newspaper called the "Augusta Sentinel," published in the state
of Georgia, May 2, 1865, a few months after Sherman had marched
through. I take an interest in this reminiscence because it re-
minds me that Slavery was the last of the Confederate forces to
surrender. That paper was issued when Jefferson Davis was a
fugitive, and when the armies of Lee and Johnstone had already
been dissolved into citizens. It contained the following adver-
tisement :
" T. Savage Hayward, auctioneer, proposes to sell at the Lower Market,
on May 3, the colored man Peter, a finished waiter, and the negro woman
Laura, a good field hand."
" Savage" was not meant for a sarcastic epithet ; it was that
portion of his Christian name which Mr. Hayward himself was
anxious to make prominent, but there was an ironical fitness in it
not intended by his parents when they named him ; for it is not
likely they foresaw the destiny of their son, or dreamed that for-
tune had selected him for auctioneer of men and women at the
Lower Market. Mr. Savage Hayward was a prudent man, he
only " proposed " to sell, and was by no means positive that he
would sell, for the colors of the National flag were already reflected
in the sky of Georgia, and perhaps the flag itself might unconstitu-
tionally invade the to*n on the morrow, and unconstitutionally en-
fold Peter the finished waiter, and Laura the good field hand, as it
unconstitutionally did. On the 'very morning of that 3d of May, an
unwelcome guest rode into the town of Augusta, at the head of a
troop of horsemen carrying in front of them the redeemed and re-
generated banner of the Union, whereupon the sale of Peter the
finished waiter, and Laura the good field hand was indefinitely
postponed.
*
When deeds of piety can be done by proxy, the most exem-
plary and religious people will be the rich and great. I have heard
of praying by machinery, but as that was a heathen practice it
makes no precedent for us, although in due time it may become
fashionable in Christendom. So many ethical and theological
novelties have been introduced of late, that it is difiicult to draw
the line between those duties that must be done in person, and
those which may be done by deputy. We have seen devoted pa-
triots in our own day, fight for their country and even die for it by
substitute ; and why may not the dummy principle be extended
so as to embrace within it all moral obligations and religious lia-
bilities ? I know a member of congress who boasts of a good
battle record which he made in the army, by substitute. He claims
credit for personal prowess in six battles, by force of the law
maxim that what a man does by his agent, he does by himself ;
therefore he, and not his proxy did the fighting and ought to have
the glory. If a man may fight the battles of his country by sub-
stitute, why may he not also work, or pray, or go to a funeral, or
take the sacrament, or perform any other duty by attorney ?
In Europe vicarious piety appears to be the privilege and
monopoly of royalty, for I notice in a recent number of an English
paper that Queen Victoria, and most of the royal family attended
the funeral of a friend without any of them taking the trouble to
go where the funeral was ; in fact they might have been at the
races or the theatre, or ahy where else while the obsequies were
going on. The Court Circular thus announces the event : "At
the funeral of the late Sir William Hoffmeister, M.D., General
The Right Hon. Sir Henry Ponsonby attended on behalf of the
Queen." I suppose it would be a breach of etiquette should a per-
son say that Sir Henry Ponsonby was present at the funeral. He
was just vicariously there as an effigy, grieving " on behalf of the
Queen," and shedding dummy tears for her. The mourning of
the Prince and Princess of Wales was done by a lord, that of the
Duke and Duchess of Edinbui'gh by a Major General, and_ that of
the Duke and Duchess of Connaught by a Colonel, an extravagant
indulgence in sorrow which was quietly rebuked by the other
members of the royal family. Princess Christian, Princess Louise,
and Prince and Princess Henry of Battenburg. These economic-
ally pooled their grief as it were, and sent it by one delegate. Col-
onel The Hon. Henry Byng, and he did not find it so very heavy
but that he was able to take a wreath along with him " on behalf
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of the Duchess of Albany." The tears of the royal family were
figuratively supposed to be wept beforehand into the white hand-
kerchiefs displayed at the funeral by Lord Colville of Culross,
Major General Cowell, Major General Ponsonby, Colonel Beecher,
and Colonel Byng, the five substititutes who did all the grieving
" on behalf of the Queen " and the rest of the royal family.
*
In the same paragraph of the Court Circular and immediately
following that description of the funeral, appears this important
piece of information, " Her Majesty and the royal family, and the
members of the royal household attended divine service at Os-
borne, on Sunday morning, the 3d." This appears to me to be a
waste of worship, and I wonder why this act of piety could not be
done as well as the other, by a lord in waiting, two Major Generals
and two Colonels. It is coming to that, and some day we shall
read in the Court Circular, that on Sunday last Lord Colville of
Culross attended divine service, offered a prayer, sung a hymn
and partook of the communion " on behalf of the Queen."
M. M. Trumbull.
BOOK REVIEWS.
A Primer of Darwinism and Organic Evolution. By /. 3'.
Bcrg^'n, Jr., and Fanny D. Be>-gi:n . Boston : Lee & Shepard,
Publishers. New York : Charles S Dillingham.
This primer is, as explained in the preface, a second edition of
"The Development Theory " by the same authors, the title having
been changed in the belief that the incorporation of the term Dar-
winism in the name of the book would indicate the nature of its
subject-matter. Its usefulness is shown by a second edition being
called for. One point in which the authors err, is in placing too
much reliance on the extreme views held by certain writers as to
the mental and moral condition of the lowest races of men. Pop-
ular as Sir John Lubbock's " Origin of Civilization" is, its con-
clusions are not always reliable and must be recei.'ed cii»i
grano sahs. They have led our authors into serious errors as to
the social and moral condition of the lower races. The statements
at pp. 191-2 beginning with the words ' ' among the lowest and most
animalistic races," and ending with "and rise to an uncontested
chieftainship," appear, indeed, to us to be so little justified by the
actual facts that they ought to be omitted, unless they are qualified
by showing what races are particularly referred to. U.
Aryan Sun-Myths the Origin of Religions. By Szra/i E.
Titcomb. With an introduction by Charles Morris. Published
by the author. Sold by Estes & Lauriat, Boston.
The authoress of this small book, which in less than two hun-
dred pages deals with a subject that to be exhaustively treated
would require much fuller consideration, very properly lays no
claim to originality, except in the arrangement of the work. Her
aim has been simply to condense the statements of other writers.
This she has done very successfully, and as a synopsis of facts the
work is valuable. Its ultimate object is shown by the title, which
however is not strictly accurate. The book is concerned with the
origin, not of all religions, but of the religions of the Indo-Ger-
manic peoples, all of whom are said to have worshipped crucified
Saviours, who were personifications of their chief god, the Sun.
The inference is that Jesus Christ is merely a personification of
such a solar deity. To establish this as a fact it would be ne-
cessary first to prove that no such person as the Jesus of the Gos-
pels lived and was crucified. The proof supplied by the authoress
in support of this contention, although it shows a connection of
developed Christian belief with the ideas of earlier religions, has
all the weakness of circumstantial evidence. The subject is, how-
ever, one of great importance and deserves closer attention than
it has yet received. We sympathize with Mr. Morris's statement
that "Christianity properly considered is not a system of belief.
but a system of ethics, "and this fact renders such bo ks as the
present of not much practical value, although they are useful to
those who wish to study the origins of theology. S2.
Songs and Sonnets of Springtime. A Modern Apostle : and
OTHER Poems. By Constance C. W. .VaiA/i. London : Kegan
Paul & Co.
The first of these volumes of poetry from the pen of one who,
although chiefly known as a scientific student, is ranked by one
so competent to judge as Mr. Gladstone among the eight English
poetesses of the nineteenth century, was published nine years ago.
The second volume was published in 1SS7, about three years be-
fore the death of the gifted authoress. None of the earlier poems
are of any great length but a glance at the tables of contents of the
two volumes shows a continuity of thought running throughout.
'
It is evident that from the very first Miss Naden's mind was en-
gaged with the deep problems of life. In her first poem "The
Astronomer " we read :
" Now has the breath of God ray being thrilled;
Within, around, His word 1 hear :
For all the universe my heart is filled
With love that casts out fear.
In one deep gaze to concentrate the whole
Of that which was, is now, shall be,
To feel it like the tliought of mine own soul.
Such power is given to me.''
Most of the poems have a distinctly religious tone, and show
clearly the mental condition of the writer, whose final thought is
probably expressed in "The Pantheist's Song of Immortality,"
which yet was one of her earliest poems :
" Yes, thou Shalt die : but these almighty forces,
That meet to form thee live for evermore ;
They hold the suns iu their eternal courses.
And shape the tiny sand-graios on the shore.
Be calmly glad, thine own true kindred seeing
In fire and storm, in flowers with dew impearled
:
Rejoice in thine imperishable being.
One with the Essence of the boundless world."
We have the ethical teaching of Miss Naden's philosophy in
the following passage from ' ' The Elixir of Life " which has a very
Buddhistic tone :
" There is one way of peace, but one—to live
The Universal Life : to make the whole
Of Nature mine: to feel the laws which give
Form to her Being, sovereign in my soul
:
By this one road, enfranchisement I gain
From the heart-stifling narrowness of pain."
In her lighter moods she composed " Evolutional Erotics " and
some of these verses are very amusing. "The Lament of the
Cork-Cell " was her earliest effort of this kind, and her latest was
" Solomon Redivivus, 1886." Here we have Darwinism portrayed
from its beginning, when the modern Sage remarks to his com-
panion :
' We were a soft Amoeba
In ages past and gone.
Ere you were Queen of Sheba,
And I King Solomon.—"
The death at an early age of a lady who combined with her
accomplishments as a poet so profound a scientific knowledge as
Miss Naden displayed, besides a love for ail that is good and true,
was a great loss to the world, but is only another illustration of the
truth that the fruit which ripens the quickest is the soonest to fall.
NOTES.
The reduction in size of T/te Open Court, announced in a for-
mer number, will take place week after next. The new Quarterly,
The Monist, appears this week. The Monist will be sent to all
subscribers to The Open Court who have prepaid their subscrip-
tions beyond Oct. ist, until the date of the expiration of such sub-
scriptions.
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THE GENESIS OF LIFE.
Prof. H. D. Garrison will lecture on this sub-
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ofMan. Both lectures will be fully illustrated.
JUST PUBLISHED!
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with a supplement
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By Dr. PAUL CARUS.
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By Thomas H. Huxley and Grant Allen.
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Professor of Comparative and Experimental
PsycHOLOGV at the College de France, and
Editor of the " Revue Philosophique."
Translated from the French with the Sanction of
the Author.
"The work will be read with an eager interest
and with profit by all who have followed the recent




" It is a closely-reasoned and luminous exposition
of a genuine piece of psychological work."
—
Nature.
"Those who desire to. understand the drift of
psychological study will do well to read this book,
and we might say that no student can well afford
to ignore it."—Cumberland Presbyterian.
" It will be granted by those who are acquainted
with the past history of Psychology, that M. Ribot
has made a real contribution to this interesting
study."— y/ic Week, Toronto.
" Treats the subject exhaustively and would do a
man credit it it were his whole life-work ; but with
Ribot it has only been one out of many. "—^«<?>-;<ra«
Hebrew.
" The book is an important and interesting con-
tribution upon a difficult s\ih']eci."—Public Opinion.
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